Target Shareholder Returns: their Magnitude and Determinants following Takeover Announcements by Domestic and International Acquirers by O'Donohoe, Shiela
Title:
The  Magnitude  and  Determinants  of  Target  Shareholder  Returns  from
International  and  Domestic  Takeover  Announcements  in  the  1990s-  some  UK
evidence
Abstract
Synergy  is  frequently  cited  as  the  motive  behind  much  of  the  global  merger  and
acquisition activity.  A large volume of empirical evidence suggests target shareholders
gain  substantially  with  acquirers  experiencing  small  losses  or  at  best  a  break-even
position.   Most  of  the  studies  focus  primarily  on  domestic  transactions  and  on  bid
characteristics in an attempt to explain potential value changes.  Whilst recent research,
largely in the US context, has started to take place on the implications of international
acquisitions, there is a scarcity of evidence in the UK.  The aim of this paper is to address
this shortcoming and to examine the magnitude and determinants of value changes to
shareholders of target firms.  This study uses a specially constructed data set covering 299
takeover  announcements  for  publicly  quoted  UK target  firms  by  both  domestic  and
international  firms  over  the  period  1990  to  1998.   The  volume  of  transactions  is
considerably higher in the 1995-98 period in contrast to 1990–94 era.  Average bid value
does not differ across country of acquirer.  It is found that target firms are characterised
by high levels of institutional ownership.    The results suggest engagement in the merger
process appears to improve the welfare of target shareholders while the determinants of
value changes indicate that corporate governance proxies, relative firm performance and
bid  features  do  help  explain  potential  returns.   It  is  concluded  that  mergers  and
acquisitions continue to play an important role in restructuring the corporate landscape in
the UK with total value of bids in our sample amounting to £160 billion.  
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Mergers and acquisitions continue to serve as a popular form of corporate restructuring.
The terms merger and acquisition are used interchangeably to describe changes in the
boundary of firms.  Target shareholders have been shown to extract most of the takeover
gains with small/insignificant losses reported for acquirers.  
The paper contributes to the debate by bringing new evidence to bear on UK takeover
bids from domestic and international bidding firms, some of which end in failure.  The
announcement effects of takeovers for target shareholders are captured over an eleven day
window followed by an analysis of the determinants of merger gains to investigate the
significance  of  target  ownership,  bidder  nationality,  relative  financial  performance  of
firms to the bid and bid features in the distribution of gains/losses.  Sources of merger
gains have been largely neglected in the literature, (Jensen & Ruback, 1983, Limmack
2000).  A greater number of foreign bids along with first time exposure of deregulated
industries to mergers are hallmarks of the UK takeover phenomena in the 1990s.  Hence
it is important to assess the more recent effects of this form of restructuring in updating
our empirical knowledge of this process.
As one of the most predominant forms of corporate restructuring, mergers and acquisition
activity  tends  to  occur  in  waves.   Each  merger  movement  has  somewhat  distinctive
characteristics  reflecting  the  dominant  economic  and  technological  factors  operating
during that particular period, (Weston et al, 1998).
The wave of the 1990s represents the largest one  based on the number of deals each year
and the size of such transactions, (Hitt et al, 1998).  Acquisitions appear as the common
solution in this era to forces driving global competition and industry consolidation.  A
sharp drop in the volume and value of UK bids  occurred between 1991 and 1994, a
gradual rise in 1995 followed by a merger boom in 1997-98.  Mulherin & Boone (2000)
observe a similar pattern in the US.
Takeovers arise due to changes in how firms redefine and renew themselves at a time of
huge change  across  industries  globally.   Mergers  represent  a  response  to  changes  in
economic  and  business  conditions  brought  about  by  technological  advances,
2
developments  in  transportation  and  communication,  changes  in  industry  regulation,
interest rates and changes in stock prices, (Weston et al., 1998).   
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the wealth effects of takeover bid announcements
and to assess the variables that prove significant in the division of gains process using a
large  sample  over  the  period  1990-1998.   This  period  is  chosen  to  capture  takeover
activity of the 1990s. An econometric analysis of the determinants of the division of gains
process is conducted.  In so doing, the intention is to try and identify the factors most
likely to play a role in the apportionment of gains.  The rest of the paper is organized as
follows.   Section  2  provides  an  overview  of  the  relevant  literature  while  section  3
documents the research questions posed.  Next  are sections 4 and 5 which outline the
methodology  and  the  sampling  frame  respectively.  Sections  6  and  7  document  the
descriptives, findings and discussion.  The final section concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review
The theories can be partitioned into two competing schools of thought; value creation and
managerialism.   Synergy fits  into the value  creation school  while  hubris  and agency,
assuming zero gains/losses belong to the managerialism school.  International mergers
and acquisitions represent a specific form of direct foreign investment (DFI).  Unlike
other modes of DFI (exporting, licensing, joint  ventures) the acquiring company takes
control over their investment.  Driving forces behind foreign takeovers are imperfections
in  factor  and  product  markets,  (Kindleberger,  1969,  Caves,  1971  &  Hymer,  1976);
imperfections and asymmetries in capital markets, (Froot & Stein, 1991), differences in
tax codes, (Scholes & Wolfson, 1990) and incumbent management that acts in its own
interest  to  the  detriment  of  shareholders,  (Jensen,  1986).  A firm’s  decision  to  invest
overseas is based on the theory that  they can take advantage of mis-priced factors of
production and at the same time overcome trade barriers.  International takeovers serve as
a mechanism of international  portfolio  diversification to  their  shareholders also.   The
theory of DFI is based on the assumption that a firm must have firm-specific resources
not available to local competitors.  The sources of such special advantage are intangible
assets, technology and management skills with the assumption that product markets are
not perfectly competitive.  
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Reasons cited for international mergers and acquisitions by Weston et al, (1998) are as
follows:  market  growth,  technology  exploitation,  product  differentiation,  government
policy  circumvention,  exchange  rate  risk  reduction,  political  and  economic  stability,
differential  labour  costs,  to  follow  clients,  business  diversification  and  the  search  of
resources.
In  summary,  international  mergers  and  acquisitions  act  as  vehicles  to  bridge
imperfections  in  factor,  product  and  capital  markets.   The  takeover  market  is  also
imperfect which may benefit foreign buyers, (Fatemi & Furtado, 1988).  Foreign exposure
entails benefits and drawbacks in the form of different economic rents and risks, (Adler &
Dumas, 1983 & Fatemi, 1984).  The theory suggests acquiring firms are buying a ‘real’
option as to where to locate production.  Value creation will ensue for acquirers from
gaining  access  to  a  new  market  and  to  a  different  stream  of  cash  flows.  Target
shareholders are alleged to gain from overseas bids assuming foreign acquirers pay more
than domestic firms to secure market entry.  This is the theory subscribed to when the
presence of a positive ‘cross-border effect’ is established. Domestic evidence to support
the synergy hypothesis suggests target shareholders benefit  significantly from takeover
bid announcements while bidding companies experience zero/small gains.    Bradley et al
(1988) report positive wealth changes in 75% of US bids.  Target firms benefit over time
while  bidders  lose;  reflecting the  impact  of  takeover  legislation.   Competition  in  the
bidding  process  and  the  Williams  Amendment  Act  1969  are  found  to  explain  value
changes.  Franks & Harris (1989) signal the significance of company size in assessing UK
takeover gains.  Positive value changes are reported in 74% of combinations.  Support is
shown for increasing target gains over time; consistent with Bradley et al (1988) and for
the role of competing bids in explaining merger gains.  More recently, Sudarsanam et al
(1996) allege support  for managerial and financial synergy as sources of gains in UK
takeovers.  They also observe changes in the wealth patterns over time with increasing
gains to targets and the inverse alleged for shareholders of acquiring firms. In addition,
firm size proves a significant determinant of value changes.
In  sum,  the  authors  suggest  takeover  bid  announcements  are  synergistic;  target
shareholders extract most of the value gains and significantly more the smaller they are
and in the presence of competing bids.  Whilst a large volume of evidence is documented
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on  the  economic  implications  of  domestic  takeovers  few  studies  extend  to  include
international takeovers.  UK evidence by Danbolt (1995) supports the synergy hypotheses
with small gains registered for acquirers; substantial gains to UK targets and small gains
overall.  Overseas bids, cash offers and target size proves significant in explaining targets
wealth.  In a similar vein, Eun et al (1996) suggest international takeovers create value.
Gains varied substantially however, across country of acquirer.  Significant determinants
of  estimated  returns  are  R&D/Sales  ratio  of  target  firms,  operating  synergy and  the
number of bids.  
Finally, Eckbo & Thornburn (2000) document support for the synergy hypothesis in their
study of US and Canadian takeovers.  Domestic bids are suggested to create more value
overall with no explanatory power found for operating synergy, payment form or target
size in determining estimated wealth effects.
Target and acquiring firms enter into merger negotiations under the expectation of value
gains  for  each of  their  respective  shareholders.   Empirical  evidence  investigating the
precise nature of this apportionment process is relatively sparse. Halpern (1973) suggests
merger gains are equally divided between the two sets of shareholders.  Furthermore, he
alleges that larger buyers derive more of the potential value more than smaller acquirers.
Bradley et  al  (1988) assert  significant  determinants of target  gains are  the number of
bidders and time of bid launch.  Acquiring firm gains are allegedly driven by takeover
legislation (Williams Amendment Act 1969) and time of the bid. 
Further US evidence by Jarrell & Poulsen (1989) asserts target gains are positively related
to the presence of competing bids with the inverse applying for acquirers.  Bidders gain
more the larger the target with the inverse holding for targets.  Gains to targets increase
from  1960s  into  the  1970s  and  1980s  with  the  opposite  established  for  acquirers,
consistent with Bradley et al (1988).
UK evidence by Franks & Harris (1989) establishes an even division of gains over the
five month period surrounding bid announcement.  However, in the month of the bid all
gains  accrue  to  target  firms.   The  presence  of  multiple  bids  and  bids  post  1968  are
deemed to have a significant positive association with target gains.  Stulz et al’s (1990)
evidence is of a positive association between target gains and the presence of managerial
ownership.   Larger  targets  are  asserted  to  gain  more  and  the  greater  the  number  of
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competing  bids.   Institutional  ownership  of  target  firms  and  prior  stake  holdings  by
acquirers serve to lower target returns significantly.
In  sum,  the  evidence  presented  to  date  suggests  important  determinants  of  the
apportionment of merger gains are target size, number of competing bids, payment form
and changes in the takeover market over time. These studies are limited in that all the
evidence reported is based on domestic samples. 
The  apportionment  of  gains  process  in  international  takeovers  remains  largely
unexplored.   The predominant emphasis is on the factors influencing target gains.  
Harris  & Ravenscraft’s  (1991)  evidence  asserts  that  foreign  bids,  competition  in  the
bidding  process  and  the  R&D/Sales  ratio  of  the  target’s  industry  prove  significant
determinants of target gains.  Returns to US target shareholders are positively associated
with the distribution of their ownership and the presence of competing bids.  Managerial
and institutional investor ownership in target firms is suggested to help extract higher
gains.   Foreign  bids  prove  a  superior  source  of  value  only  if  a  majority  interest  is
purchased.  US evidence by Swenson (1993) suggests superior target gains from foreign
bids and those in the manufacturing sector.  Cash offers and competition in the bidding
process are positively linked to such value changes.  Dollar weakness is alleged to result
in  greater  target  returns.   In  sum,  the  apportionment  of  gains  between  shareholders
‘depends on information,  relative learning costs,  and the competitive environment for
particular targets’, (Swenson 1993, p. 275).
UK evidence on the distribution of gains alleges higher returns to targets from overseas
bids, (Danbolt 1995).  Smaller firms benefit more with cash offers and competing bids
having a significant positive effect also. 
In sum, the evidence suggests very similar results to that portrayed for domestic bids with
the common themes of payment form and competition in the bidding process shown to
explain targets gains.  In addition, targets appear to benefit from overseas bids although 
Dewenter (1995) and Eckbo & Thorburn (2000) find no support for this hypothesis.
3. Research Questions
Following  the  review  of  the  literature  and  the  continuing  growth  of  mergers  and
acquisitions, we attempt to investigate the following research questions in the context of
UK takeover announcements:
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1) Which industries are involved in UK takeovers in the 1990s?
2) What are the wealth effects from the announcement of UK takeover bids for target
shareholders?
3) What factors determine the division of gains to target shareholders?
Our first question is addressed with a full description of the industry sectors of target and
bidding  firms  provided.   This  facilitates  comparison  with  the  evidence  of  Ryngaert
(2000). Our second and third questions are addressed via an event study and regression
analyses respectively. The determinants of changes in target shareholders wealth include
measures of ownership structure, bidder nationality, the relative financial performance of
the merging firms and features of the bid.  We test  first  for the significance of target
institutional and managerial ownership along with a pre-bid stake of the acquirer.
UK institutional investors are deemed more active than their US counterparts where they
account for two thirds of the level of UK ownership, (Black, 1990, Roe, 1991, Black &
Coffee, 1994).  Some evidence exists to suggest UK institutions engage in monitoring in
a  private  way,  (Short  &  Keasy,  1999).   We  test  the  role  of  this  disclosed  outside
blockholder of equity in the determination of gains.  Target wealth changes are deemed
inversely  related  to  the  presence  of  their  institutional  owners,  Stulz  et  al,  (1990),
Sudarsanam et  al,  (1996)  which is  in  contrast  to  the  international  evidence  by Kang
(1993).
Two competing views pertain on the role of target management and gains accruing to
their  shareholders.   A  positive  and  significant  relationship  is  established  between
managerial  shareholdings  and  target  gains  in  successful  contested  bids,  (Song  and
Walkling, 1993) and in the international merger study of Kang (1993).  Evidence of the
opposite effect is found by Billet & Ryngaert (1997.
Controversial evidence exists on the wealth effects of a prior stake holding by bidders in
target firms.  This stake may act as a signal of the bidder’s assessment of target value
post-bid, (Choudhny & Jegadeesh, 1994 
Empirical  analysis  to  date  of  international  acquisitions  is  primarily  US  based  with
superior target gains suggested from overseas bids compared to domestic ones.  Studies
by Harris & Ravenscraft (1991), Swenson (1993) and Cheng & Chan (1995) support the
‘cross border’ hypothesis.  In contrast, studies by Servaes & Zenner (1990), Dewenter
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(1995) and Eckbo & Thornburn (2000) show no support for these phenomena.  Little UK
evidence exists on international takeovers except for Conn & Connell (1990) and Danbolt
(1995).  The rationale for this ‘cross border effect’ remains an unresolved issue, Danbolt
(1995).
Little has been done to capture the impact of financial performance on the apportionment
of gains process.  The synergy hypothesis presumes differences in the efficiency level
between bidder and target.  Managerial synergy emerges when  a more efficient bidder
acquires an under-performing target. Servaes (1991) and Lang et al (1991) establish an
inverse and significant association between a target’s Q ratio and its  share of merger
gains.  Defined as the market value of equity to the current replacement cost of net assets,
firms with a low Tobin’s Q are deemed inefficient or undervalued. Firms with low market
to  book ratios  are  deemed ‘cheap’  buys,  (Palepu,  1986).   An inverse  and significant
association between this ratio and target gains is hypothesized in this study.  
Van Hulle & Sercu (1991) assert in their theoretical paper that the financial strength of
the bidder and target may play a role in determining the apportionment of takeover gains.
They suggest bidding firms with liquidity problems will have less bargaining power, as
cash availability is paramount to deal completion.  Barnes (1998) hypothesised that better
performing bidders (relative to their target) would extract more of the takeover gains.
We capture  measures  of  growth,  profitability,  leverage,  liquidity  and  future  financial
performance using the relative sales growth ratio, relative return on equity, relative debt,
relative  cash  and  relative  Price  Earnings  (PE)  ratios.   Similar  ratios  are  used  in  the
takeover prediction study of Palepu (1986) and the variables are defined in the same
manner  as  Palepu  (1986).  Results  of  the  correlations  suggest  no  multicollinearity
problems between the ratios.  
Our test for the presence of bargaining power is conducted via the following four ratios.
1. Relative sales growth rate of bidder to target over the three years prior to the bid.  
2. Relative pre-tax profits to Shareholders Funds of bidder to target.
3. Relative total borrowings to Capital Employed of target to bidder.  
4. Relative cash to total assets of bidder to target.
5. Relative Price- Earnings ratio of bidder to target 3 months prior to the bid.  
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Used  as  a  proxy  of  efficiency  of  the  bidding  firm,  we  hypothesise  a  negative
association  between  (a)  the  relative  sales  growth  rates,  (b)  the  relative  return  on
shareholders equity (c) the relative debt ratio (d) the relative liquidity ratios and (e)
the relative PE ratios.  Under bargaining power bidders are alleged to extract a greater
share of expected gains from a more indebted and cash constrained targets. 
In addition to the independent variables, we capture the impact of the variables alleged as
significant  in  the  cross  sectional  regression framework of  other  merger studies.   Bid
features or characteristics primarily fit into this category.  In summary, the main control
variables are the reaction of target management to a bid announcement,  bid outcome,
relative firm size and the presence of competing bids and form of payment employed.
We hypothesise that  target shareholders gain more the greater the number of bidders,
from cash only offers,  the smaller  targets  are in  relation to  bidders  with no direction
specified on bid outcome and reaction to merger bid.
4. Methodology
Given the discussion on the factors that influence the division of gains process, our model
to test this division is specified below.
Proportionate synergy to target shareholders = %GAINSTGT
= f (%TGT INST INV + % MGT INV + PRIOR + COUNTRY+ MKT TO BK > 1 + REL
SLSG + REL PROFITS + REL DEBT + REL CASH + REL PE + REACT + OUTCOM +
LN REL SIZE + NUMBER + PAYMENT)
%GAINSTGT  is that calculated under the event study
Our  model  tests  for  the  significance  of  target  ownership,  bidder  nationality,
undervaluation and bargaining power in the distribution of gains process.  These variables
are combined in a cross sectional regression model will help establish the significance of
bidder  nationality,  relative  firm  performance  and  the  control  variables  in  the
apportionment of value changes.  
An event study is employed to assess share price reaction around the time of a takeover
bid.  Applied as a measure of investor expectations, it captures the market’s short term
reaction  to  merger  bids.   Event  studies  have  been  extensively  employed  to  analyse
domestic  and  international  acquisitions,  (Servaes  &  Zenner,  1994,  Limmack,  1991,
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Eckbo & Thornburn, 2000).    The market model is the most popular approach adopted to
compare the actual returns on a security against that expected if there had been no bid.
The differences or abnormal returns are viewed as residuals, reflecting the effect of an
event  specific  to  a  company.   Returns  comprise  of  share  price  appreciation  plus
dividends. 
Under the assumption of multivariate normality, abnormal returns (prediction error) to
security j on day t can be written as 
ARjt = Rjt – ( + jRmt)
Where ARjt  = abnormal return to firm j on day t 
Rjt  = actual or realised return to security j on event day t
 +  jRmt = expected returns to security j on event day t
 = alpha and  = beta, the market model parameter estimates and 
Rmt = market return on event day t.
Estimates for  and  are calculated over the estimation period using OLS.  Values of 
and   are estimated by regressing Rjt on Rmt.  The assumption is that the intercept and
slope terms,  and , are constant over the time period during which the model is fitted to
the available data.
These coefficients  represent  the intercept  and slope respectively of  the market  model
regression.  This is run over a 200 day estimation period, from 250 trading days to 50
trading  days  prior  to  the  initial  event  date  t,  the  first  date  of  the  official  bid
announcement.   Mikkelson & Partch (1988)  and Mc Willliams  et  al,  (1999)  adopt  a
similar estimation period.   Estimated parameters  from the regression and the realised
return on the market are used to forecast the firm’s expected return.  This is compared
with actual returns achieved and the difference is classed as abnormal returns.
The  mean  Cumulative  Abnormal  Return  (CAR)  serve  a  measure  of  the  total  wealth
effects of a takeover bid for each participating firm.  We derive CARs based on a short
window of (-5,+5) days, similar to Bradley, Desai & Kim (1988), Eun et al (1995) &
Kang (1993).
 Tests of the statistical significance of abnormal returns for time t (for each day within the
event period) are carried out with a Z statistic.  We derive a Z statistic following a similar
procedure  to  Patell  (1976)  and  Dodd  (1980).  Measures  of  CARt  are  independent,
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identically distributed and normal.  Adjustment for heteroskedasticity has been conducted
here  using  the  appropriate  technique,  consistent  with  White’s  (1980)  test  for
heteroskedasticity.  
5. Sample and Sampling frame
The sampling frame consists of bids by domestic and foreign firms for UK companies
between 1st January 1990 and 31st December 1998.  The source for the sampling frame is
Acquisitions Monthly/AMDATA. Bidding and target firms are publicly quoted companies.
A total of 771 bids is launched consisting of 476 domestic (62%) and 295 (38%) foreign
takeover  announcements.   Between  1992  and  the  end  of  1994  a  marked  decline  in
takeover  activity occurred  coinciding  with  the  global  recession.   A gradual  recovery
emerged in 1995 with a surge of bids arising in 1997.  Results reported exclude takeover
announcements involving financial firms due to their unique asset and trading structure.
This final sample consists  of 236 takeover announcements.   All  of the financial  data,
number and type of shares along with share price information and daily returns data have
been  extracted  from  Primark  Datastream  and  the Stock  Exchange  Annual.
6.DESCRIPTIVES
In this sample even though foreign bids come from 32 different countries, 88% of the
volume and 92% of the value of all bids emerge from 12 countries.  Included in these are
the  US,  Canada,  France,  Germany,  Denmark,  Switzerland,  Sweden,  Norway,  the
Netherlands, Ireland, Japan and Australia.  
Insert Table A
Of the 13 countries featured in the sample these can be grouped into the following blocks:
domestic (61%), US and Canada, (24%), European (12.5%) and Australian/Japan (2.5%).
The analysis involves 10 different currency zones and 13 different stock market indices.
Approximately  three  quarters  of  all  bids  are  agreed  and  are  successful  upon  first
announcement.  Bid revision increases the success rate significantly and the total number
of abandoned bids is 9% of the sample.  Bidding contests for target occur in 17% of cases
on average.  Cash only offers arise in 58% of bids. A significant difference is suggested
between foreign and domestic deals in respect of cash offers.  The mean institutional
ownership in target firms is 33.12% while the average managerial  ownership is 11.04%.
The average market to-book ratio of bidder to target is 1.81; suggesting that bidding firms
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have substantially higher valuations that their  targets.   Bidders are asserted to have a
higher  sales  growth  rates  also.   Relative  profitability  is  low  but  again  considerable
variation is  suggested with the  large standard deviation.   Targets  are  alleged to  have
significantly more debt in contrast to bidding firms.  In a similar vein, bidding firms are
suggested to have greater liquidity and higher PE ratios than targets. 
Targets are approximately 47% of bidder’s size compared to 37% reported by Duggal &
Millar (1999). 
7. Findings
Our first research question seeks to establish the distribution of UK industries subject to
takeover  bids.  Bids  are  classified  according  to  the  industry  sector  under  the  FTSE
classification  process.   Manufacturing  companies  are  very significant  in  the  sample,
similar  to  the  evidence  of  Harris  &  Ravenscraft  (1991)  and  Swenson  (1993).
Deregulation of utilities in the UK appears to have opened up a new sector to acquisition
activity in the 1990s.  Accounting for 8% of bids in this sample, firms in the utility sector
are especially popular among foreign acquirers.  Mitchell  & Mulherin (1996) observe
significant patterns in US acquisitions across industries in the 1980s.  
Industry analysis of bidding and target firms
Takeover bids emerge from 70 different industrial sectors with the most prominent in the
following areas:
1) Engineering (7.6%)
2) Building and construction (5.6%)
3) Publishing, Newspapers and Print (4.4%)
4) Diversified (4.4%)
5) Business support services (3.6%)
6) Electrical equipment manufacturers (3.6%).
7) Electricity (3.6%).
Insert Table B
No overwhelming evidence exists to suggest clustering around particular sectors.
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The more merger active sectors are in the more mature industries, i.e general industrials,
basic industries, cyclical services and utilities.
Partitioning bidding firms into foreign and domestic reveals overseas bidders come from
fewer sectors, 42 in all, and are more prevalent in the following areas:
(1) Diversified (10.64%)
(2) Electronic equipment manufacturers  (8.5%)
(3) Building and construction  (5.3%)
(4) Electricity (5.3%)
(5) Business support services (4.26%)
Domestic bidders come from 57 sectors;  a much broader range of industries than the
foreign category.  The most popular domestic bidders are from the following:
(a) Engineering (10.26%)
(b) Building and construction (5.77%)
(c) Publishing, newspapers and printers (5.13%)
(d) Food processors and wholesalers  (4.49%).
An analysis of target firms suggests takeovers bids occur in 64 industrial sectors, the most
popular in the sample being:
(1) Electronic equipment manufacturers (6.4%)
(2) Engineering (6%)
(3) Publishing, Newspapers & Printers (4.4%)
(4) Food processors & wholesalers (4%)
(5) Electrical equipment (4%)
(6) Broadcasting contractors (4%)
Insert Table C
A more specific analysis of target firms suggests 5 sectors account for 26% of all bids.
Domestic targets are primarily engaged in the following industries:
I. Broadcasting contractors (5.8%)
II. Electronic equipment (5.2%)
III. Engineering companies (5.2%)
IV. Food processors and wholesalers (5.2%)
V. Electrical equipment (4.5%)
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Bids by foreign companies are most popular in the following sectors:
a) Electronic equipment (8.5%)
b) Engineering companies (7.5%)
c) Electricity (5.3%)
d) Media Agencies (Advertising, Marketing, PR) (5.3%)
e) Publishing, Newspapers & Printers (5.3%)
f) Rail, Road and Transport (5.3%).
In sum, firms engaged in the manufacturing of electronic equipment and more general
engineering companies are the two most common targets by all bidders in the sample.
Our  second  research  question  concerns  the  estimated  wealth  effects  in  terms  of  the
cumulative  abnormal  returns  accruing  to  target  shareholders.   Shareholders  are
demonstrated to experience positive wealth changes.  Mean gains reported for the main
sample (first  and non-financial  bids) are 23.7% in the (-5,+5) day period.   These are
significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level with wealth changes demonstrated in
over 80% of cases.  Support of the positive ‘cross-border effect’ emerges.  Foreign bids
are alleged to be statistically more synergistic than domestic ones.  In addition, gains are
substantially higher in the merger active period than in the early 1990s when insignificant
losses  are reported.   Finally, larger targets  yield statistically more than smaller  firms.
Considerable variations in value changes are reported over time as demonstrated by the
minimum and maximum percentage figures.
Insert Table D
Overseas announcements, those in the 1995-98 period and bids for smaller targets are
suggested to yield greater returns.  Our results are consistent with Swenson (1993), Eun et
al  (1996),  and  Kang (1993);  the  latter suggesting  evidence  of  superior  gains  for  US
targets during more merger active years, 1986-1988, the latter part of their main sample
1975-88.
We next present evidence of the inter- relationship between expected wealth changes and
the distribution of target ownership, relative firm performance and control variables.  This
is  conducted  in  order  to  establish  the  important  determinants  of  target  shareholders
wealth.  Table E provides cross sectional regression results over the 11 days (on average)
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around takeover announcement.  The first two equations are specific to the main sample
with  the  final  two capturing  changes  in  takeover  intensity over  time.   Equation  1  is
replicated for the two sub-samples that express differences in the volume of bids over the
nine-year period.   Considerable  explanatory power is  provided by the equations  with
equation 2 offering slightly more explanation than equation 1.  
Insert Table E
Our results suggest no major explanatory role is suggested for the overall distribution of
target ownership in determining abnormal returns.  The exception is in the equation 2
when  the  non-linear  form of  institutional  ownership  is  suggested  to  be  positive  and
significantly associated with target returns.  Both managerial and prior ownership stakes
are depicted to be negative but insignificantly associated with target returns.  Foreign bids
are deemed more synergistic but insignificantly so, thereby lending no support for the
positive ‘cross-border’ hypothesis for target shareholders.
Proxies for relative firm performance offer most of the explanatory power in the analyses.
Target  shareholders  are  suggested  to  gain  significantly  the  greater  the  relative  sales
growth of their buyers, opposite to that hypothesised under bargaining power.  Yet their
wealth  changes  are  inversely and  significantly related  to  bidders  relative  profitability
ratio.  This relationship is in even more significant in equation 2 than in equation 1.  In a
similar vein, sellers allegedly do better the less indebted they are and the coefficient on
relative debt is significant at the five per cent level over both equations.  Limited support
is thus demonstrated for the presence of bargaining power.
Equation 2 is robust to the findings in equation 1 except for the significance of target
institutional ownership denoted in equation 2.  All other coefficients depict similar signs
across  the  models.   Hostile  and  multiple  bids  and  mixed  payments  are  positively
associated  with  target  shareholder  abnormal  returns.   However  none  of  these  control
variables prove significantly different from zero.  
Changes  in  the  takeover  market  over  time  are  depicted  in  the  final  two  equations.
Substantially greater explanatory power is suggested for the 1990/94 period than for the
1995/98 era.  Post 1995, the period of greater takeover intensity, the explanatory power
provided  is  weak  and  insignificant.   Four  independent  variables  prove  significant
determinants  of  target  shareholder  returns.   Consistent  with  the  main  sample  and
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significant at the five per cent level target institutional investors, the relative sales growth
rate and relative profitability ratio are suggested to help explain target wealth changes.  In
addition and specific to this sub-sample failed bids are also suggested to yield greater
gains.
Results  for  the  1990-94  period,  the  merger  inactive  era,  denote  three  significant
coefficients,  Target shareholders gain more the lower their  relative debt  ratio to their
buyers, the higher bidders relative PE ratio is and the smaller their own relative size.  The
result for relative debt is consistent with the main sample.  The significance of the relative
PE ratio is consistent with the earlier evidence in respect of the relative sales growth ratio.
Finally, smaller targets gain more, consistent with Jarrell & Poulsen (1989), Franks &
Harris  (1989)  and  Housten  &  Ryngaert  (1994).   The  assertion  again  is  that  better
performing sellers benefit more and smaller firms present fewer integration difficulties.  
Three key variables are suggested to determine target returns for the main sample.  These
include  relative  sales  growth,  relative  profitability  and  relative  debt  ratios.   The
significance  and  direction  on  the  latter  two  coefficients  are  as  hypothesised  under
bargaining power.
Over the 1995/98 period the coefficients and significance of relative sales growth and
relative profitability remain important determinants of returns as reported for the main
sample.  Some role is also suggested for target institutional owners.  In addition,  bid
outcome plays a significant role in the apportionment of sellers returns.   Specific to the
1990/94 period are the significance of relative firm size and relative PE ratio, the latter
consistent with the assertion alluded to for the relative sales growth ratio in the other
samples.
In summary, cross sectional event study evidence reported here suggests the variables
significant in determining target shareholder returns are primarily the relative debt ratio
and relative sales growth rate of bidder to target.  Shareholders benefit the lower their
debt relative to bidders and the greater the relative sales growth ratio.  This indirectly
supports  the  undervaluation  hypothesis.   Limited  support  is  shown in  support  of  the
presence of bargaining power.
Changes in the market for corporate control over time are controlled for in the same way
as Bradley et al (1988), Franks & Harris (1989), Kang (1993), Sudarsanam et al (1996)
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and Becher (2000).  Significant determinants of target returns in the 1995-98 period are
suggested as target institutional owners, relative sales growth rate of bidder to target and
bid outcome.  The prominence of institutional ownership post 1995 is consistent with
Black & Coffee’s (1994) evidence of UK institutional ownership activism.  However, the
explanatory  power  provided  for  the  1995-98  era  is  very  low  hence  limiting  our
interpretation.
Revised bids (not reported) are depicted to have a positive but insignificant impact on
target returns across all event windows.  It serves ‘as a natural part  of the bargaining
process rather than an anticipation of other potential  bidders,’ (Franks & Harris  1989
p.240).  Finally, in the merger inactive period sellers gain the less indebted they are, the
greater  the  PE  ratio  of  their  buyers  and  the  smaller  they  are.   Partial  support  is
demonstrated for the importance of relative sales growth and bid outcome.  
Discussion:
Consistent  with  the  merger  literature,  takeover  announcements  are  deemed  to  yield
substantial returns for selling shareholders.  Target returns are suggested to be registered
relatively quickly around bid announcement, the ‘event’ per se.
We explore the determinants of target returns using a broad mix of variables.  No support
is  demonstrated  for  our  hypotheses  in  respect  of  the  other  two  ownership  variables.
Bidder nationality is not deemed to play a significant role with no evidence of a positive
‘cross  border  effect’.   Evidence  to  support  the  role  of  bargaining  power  in  the
determination of target returns is presented for three of our proxies.  Just as hypothesized,
targets are deemed to gain less the more indebted they are relative to buyers and the more
profitable their buyers.  We test the sensitivity of the market to book ratio and relative
debt  ratio  by  excluding  them  from  the  main  sample  and  the  1990/94  sub-sample
respectively (not reported).  
The coefficient on bid outcome is in the direction expected.  Failed bids are depicted to
generate higher target returns consistent with Bradley et al (1983) and Limmack (1991).
Some  evidence  is  presented  for  the  role  of  relative  firm  size.   Smaller  targets  are
suggested to gain more, as hypothesised and consistent with Jarrell & Poulsen (1989) and
Housten & Ryngaert (1994). Finally, agreed bids and mixed payment forms rather than
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hostile  and  all  cash  offers  are  allegedly  more  value  creating.   The  opposite  to  that
hypothesised, none of these variables prove significantly different from zero.  
In sum, our analysis suggests positive wealth changes for target shareholders.  Exploring
the determinants of target returns suggest some evidence for the role of bargaining power.
8. Conclusion
Although an extensive literature exists  on assessing the wealth effects  of mergers for
target  shareholders  most  of  it  is  based  on  domestic  studies.   In order  to  address  the
shortcomings in previous research, this paper provides an investigation of the magnitude
and determinants of target shareholders gains around bid announcement. 
 Consistent  with  previous  studies,  target  shareholders  are  deemed  to  experience
substantial returns.  
Some statistical support is demonstrated for the role of bargaining power in determining
selling  shareholder  returns.  Partitioning  the  sample  to  reflect  differences  in  merger
intensity over the nine year period presents some differences in the explanatory power of
some  of  the  independent  variables.   The  market  response  appears  more  favourable
towards  combinations  of  stronger  firms measured in terms  of  debt,  sales  growth  and
profitability.   Value  changes  are  extracted  from  a  number  of  sources.   The  most
unexpected finding is the failure to find any significant association between country of
bidder and target returns, for the main sample of bids across both methodologies.    
We explore the distribution of industries subject to takeovers in the 1990s.  Most firms
are engaged in  manufacturing  and  no  major  difference  appears  in  industries  targeted
across  country  of  acquirer.   Deregulation  of  the  utility  sector  in  the  UK  did  see
participation by electricity companies in particular in takeovers.
There are a number of limitations to the work presented here.  First, the sample of target
and bidding firms selected are publicly listed and as such the analyses concentrates on
takeovers in this sector and not the entire population of firms engaged in takeovers.  
Second,  there  are  a  number  of  data  limitations.   Our  study is  restricted  to  a  limited
number  of  international  regions.  Data  on  firm  specific  variables  are  at  best  only
surrogates for the measure of relative bargaining power between bidding and target firms.
Despite adjustments to reflect differences in international accounting procedures, there
may  still  be  unobservable  differences  due  to  the  cultural,  institutional  and  political
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environments.  Ratios are used as measures of financial performance and as proxies for
bargaining power.  The properties of these measures have been found to be non-normal in
the literature, (Barnes 1982).  Third, our methodology fails to capture the longer term
effects of the takeovers.  Merger gains reported are expected gains and may not reflect the
real sources of value to be derived. 
Fourth, we explicitly test for expected synergies in the quest for control over UK targets.
However,  gains  can  arise  from other  sources  apart  from operational,  management  or
financial  sources  such  as  the  break-up  of  the  target  or  due  to  the  release  of  new
information about the companies involved, (Bradley et al.1983).  This study is specific to
an analysis of portfolio restructuring and not organizational restructuring
Finally, what exactly determines the negotiation/bargaining process between target and
bidding firms remains  an unresolved issue.   The role  of prior acquisition experience,
strategy of  investment  banks/advisers  to  the  parties  or  prior  negotiations  with  target
management may play a role but which are not documented here.  Whilst this research
goes some way to  explaining the  type of firms engaged in  takeover,  there are  still  a
number of questions un-addressed.
Investigation into why bids fail and the role of prior acquisition experience in the UK
could provide a clearer indication of motives for takeovers.  In a similar vein, an analysis
of the number of lines of business engaged in by target and bidding companies may shed
light on the role of acquisitions in company strategy formulation.   Extending the analysis
to a more industrial focus may help capture the implications of takeovers on patterns of
industry consolidation  in  the  UK.   Furthermore,  the  technological  capacity of  parties
involved  in  mergers  may  reveal  interesting  information  on  the  exploitation  of  firm
specific advantages.  
Finally, an interesting extension would be to apply the context to a comparative analysis
of US target firms in the 1990s.  In sum, an extension of the analysis, the data set and
comparison across regions remains a rich but relatively unexplored avenue of research.
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Table B Bidding firms industries in order of importance across country of acquirer
Bidders Industry Domestic Bidders Industry Foreign
Engineering companies 10.26% Diversified Industries 10.64%
Building and construction materials 5.77% Electronic Equipment 8.51%
Publishing, newspapers, printers 5.13% Building and construction materials 5.32%
Food processors & wholesalers 4.49% Electricity- generators/distrib 5.32%
Business support services 3.21% Business support services 4.26%
Miscellanous 3.2% Miscellaneous 4.26%
Aerospace 2.56% Banks 3.19%
Banks 2.56% Chemicals, speciality 3.19%
Broadcasting 2.56% Electrical equip- manufacturers 3.19%
Electricity- generators/distributors 2.56% Engineering companies 3.19%
Electrical equip- manufacturers 2.56% Leisure equipment manuf 3.19%
Food & Drug retailers 2.56% Media agencies 3.19%
Retailers-  hardlines,  single  class  of
goods
2.56% Publishing, newspapers, printers 3.19%
Other Construction 2.56% Chemicals, commodity 2.13%
Restaurants, pubs, breweries 2.56% Distillers & Vinters 2.13%
Real Estate 2.56% Distributors 2.13%
Clothing & Footwear manufacturers 2.56% Engineering fabricators 2.13%
Builders merchants 1.92% Food processors & wholesalers 2.13%
Chemicals, speciality 1.92% Pharmaceuticals 2.13%
Vehicle distribution 1.92% Rail, Road and Freight 2.13%
Home Entertainment 1.92% Software manufacturers 2.13%
Security and alarm services 1.925 Telecommunication equip manuf 2.13%
Software providers 1.92% Automobile manuf & assemblers 1.06%
Computer service procedures 1.92% Auto part manufacturers 1.06%
Water companies 1.92% Broadcasting contractors 1.06%
Auto-part manufacturers 1.28% Chemicals, Advanced materials 1.06%
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Distillers & Vinters 1.28% Distributors  of  industrial  components
& equipment
1.06%
Leisure facility providers 1.28% Engineering fabricators 1.06%
Retailers- multi dept 1.28% Gaming & casino facilities 1.06%
Oil and gas exploration 1.28% Insurance brokers 1.06%
Packaging manufacturers 1.28% Insurance -general 1.06%
Pharmaceuticals 1.28% Leisure faculty providers 1.06%
Shipping & Ports 1.28% Retailers- multi dept 1.06%
Asset managers 0.64% Oil and gas exploration 1.06%
Breweries 0.64% Oil, integrated companies 1.06%
Cable and satellite 0.64% Oil Services- drilling 1.06%
Chemicals, advanced materials 0.64% Other Insurance 1.06%
Clothing and footwear manufacturers 0.64% Packaging manufacturers 1.06%
Commercial Vehicle and Truck manuf 0.64% Security and alarm services 1.06%
Diversified 0.64% Shipping and ports 1.06%
Distributors of industrial components 0.64% Clothing and footwear manufacturers 1.06%
Electrical equip manufacturers 0.64%
Gaming & casino facilities 0.64%




Medical equip manufacturers 0.64%
Photographic equip manufacturers 0.64%
Rail, road, transport 0.64%
Telecomm equip manufacturers 0.64%





Table C Target firms industries in order of importance across country of acquirer
Targets Industry Foreign Targets Industry Domestic
Electronic Equipment 8.51% Broadcasting contractors 5.77%
Engineering companies- general 7.45% Miscellaneous 5.77%
Electricity –generators & distributors 5.32% Engineering companies- general 5.13%
Media Agencies (Advertising, PR) 5.32% Food processors & wholesalers 5.13%
Publishing, Newspapers and Printers 5.32% Electronic Equipment 5.13%
Rail, road and transport 5.32% Electrical equipment, manuf of comp 4.49%
Miscellaneous 4.25% Publishing, newspapers & printers 3.85%
Building and construction materials 3.19% Building and construction materials 3.21%
Business Support Services 3.19% Retailers- Hardlines. 3.21%
Chemicals, speciality 3.19% Leisure facility providers 3.21%
Distributors -other 3.19% Packaging manufacturers 3.21%
Electrical  equipment,  manufacturers
of components and equipment
3.19% Water companies 3.21%
Retailers- Hardlines. 3.19% Food & drug retailers 2.56%
Medical  Equipment  and  Suppliers  ,
manuf
3.19% Biotechnology and drugs 2.56%
Asset management 2.13% Restaurants, pubs & breweries 2.56%
Distibutors 2.13% Real Estate 2.56%
Education,  Business  Training  &
Employ
2.13% Aerospace 1.925
Food processors & wholesalers 2.13% Auto parts manufactures 1.92%
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Oil  integrated  co  -exploration,
production, refining & distrib
2.13% Clothing & footwear 1.92%
Other construction 2.13% Electricity generators/distributors 1.92%
Producers of comp software 2.13% House building 1.92%
Water companies 2.13% Other business units 1.92%
Auto parts manufacturers 1.06% Builders merchants 1.28%
Broadcasting contractors 1.06% Chemicals, speciality 1.28%
Chemicals, commodity 1.06% Chemicals, advanced materials 1.28%
Clothing & footwear manufacturers 1.06% Vehicle distributors 1.28%
Distillers & Vinters 1.06% Engineering fabricators 1.28%
Diversified 1.06% Hotel 1.28%
Engineering fabricators 1.06% Medical equipment and supplies manuf 1.28%
Food & Drug retailers 1.06% Producers of computer software 1.28%
Insurance brokers 1.06% Textiles 1.28%
Insurance- Non-Life 1.06% Asset management 0.64%
Leisure Facility Providers 1.06% Banks 0.64%
Oil and Gas- Exploration & Producer 1.06% Business support services 0.64%
Oil Services, drilling for oil and gas 1.06% Cable and satellite 0.64%
Other business services 1.06% Chemicals, commodity 0.64%
Packaging, manufacturers 1.06% Distillers & Vitners 0.64%
Biotechnology and Drugs 1.06% Diversified 0.64%
Telecommunication  equipment
manufacturers
1.06% Distributors- other 0.64%
Waste  management  and  disposal
services
1.06% Education and business training 0.64%
Engineering companies- general manuf 0.64%




Leisure Equipment manufacturers 0.64%
Media Agencies 0.64%
Retailers- multi dept 0.64%
Non ferrous metal manufacturers 0.64%
Oil & Gas Exploration & Producer 0.64%
Oil Integrated companies 0.64%
Other construction 0.64%
Rail, road, transport 0.64%
Security and alarm services 0.64%
Shipping & Ports 0.64%
Total 100% Total 100%
Table D  Descriptive Statistics of target gains, % terms over (-5,5) days
CAR of target
(-5, +5) days
 Mean % Median  Minimum Max %  positive
and sig 
Number
Main sample 23.7 25.2 -54.3 138.9 88.8% 226
Foreign bids 27.6 27.2 -6.14 138.9 88.1% 87
Domestic 21.9 24.2 -54.3 112.6 87.1% 139
1995-98 bids 25.5 23.7 -5.04 138.9 90.4% 153
1990-94 bids 20.6 26.5 -54.3 95.1 85.6% 73
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Target  <  30%
bidder size
24.4 27.8 -54.3 138.9 89.9% 150
Target > 100%
bidder size
19.5 13.04 .413 51.2 83% 21
23
Table   E  Determinants of Target Shareholder Abnormal Returns over (-5,+5) trading days.  Standardised CAR (–5,
+5) trading days. (t-statistics in parentheses)  *** Significant at 0.001, ** at 0.05 level, * at 0.10 level.





























































































































N 224 224 152 72
Adjusted R2 .415 .413 .026 .821
F 14.19*** 13.08*** 1.34 28.26***
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